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Introduction 
 
Competition law and economics literature has always thought of the relation between 
the principle of competition and government action in antagonistic terms. According 
to the Chicago school of antitrust economics, state action or government induced 
action is considered as the most frequent source for restrictions of competition.
1
 
Public choice theories have also cast doubt on the motivations of state action, thus 
contributing with the Chicago school of economic analysis to lay the foundations of a 
distinct theory of government failure, with the aim to marginalize government, which 
completes the market failure dominated theories of neo-classical economics
2
. The 
perception that the state constitutes a natural monopoly, with the ability to coerce any 
economic provider operating in its territory to adopt and maintain anticompetitive 
conduct for an indefinite period of time, without any challenge, has formed the core 
claim of the deregulation agenda worldwide. The anti-competitive effects of 
government action can even be felt post-liberalization with a number of entrenched 
dominant positions by former monopoly incumbents being preserved through 
anticompetitive conduct. Some authors have even characterised public restraints as a 
global limit to competition law, calling for an active enforcement of competition law 
against government action that benefits special interests.
3
 In contrast, others have 
argued that “the democratic process contains many flaws, but curing them is no 
antitrust‟s assignment” and that “if Congress wanted to draft anti-capture legislation it 
could do so, but one would hardly imagine that this legislation would forbid 
monopoly or combinations in restraint of trade while explicitly saying nothing about 
abuses of governmental process”, and have advanced a more limited role for antitrust 
in the process of “democratic government”. 4 
 These different perspectives illustrate the complexity of the matter as it is 
unclear how and to what extent the different variables authors usually take into 
account when confronting “competition law” with “state” action (the “democratic 
process”, “private interests”, “public” versus “private” restraints, “special” versus 
“general” interests) are interlinked with each other, and/or if they should be analysed 
separately. For example, in the absence of a proper “democratic process”, should 
antitrust always apply in order to preserve some form of market competition, the 
assumption being that in the absence of electoral competition, market or “quasi-
market” (in the case of an administered economy) competition is the only option left 
to promote efficiency, the latter concept conceived as policies corresponding to 
citizens‟ (for the purpose of political competition) or consumers‟ (for the purposes of 
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market competition) preferences?
5
 How would one go about addressing the distinction 
between “public” and “private” restraints, when the enforcement mechanism of the 
state is frequently used to orchestrate “private” restraints of competition6? Would the 
distinction between “public” and “private” or that of “political” versus “market” 
competition always hold, when it is possible that restrictions of market competition 
may be traded for political support (power) and thus limit electoral competition or 
when governments frequently act through private actors?  
An underlying assumption, common to these perspectives, is that the “state” is 
juxtaposed to the “market”, the two forming different conceptual categories, having a 
defined timeless meaning across different cultures. There is no effort to explore inside 
the black-box of the “State” and understand the operation of the different branches of 
power, their internal bureaucracies, the beliefs of the agents whose actions comprise 
the phenomena to be explained, or their interaction within a specific society; at most, 
there is a one-dimensional effort to apply to the state a markets-inspired analysis. 
Nonetheless, if public choice theory applies to political science analysis the 
conceptual framework of markets, it has not adequately taken into account the input 
of the political science or political sociology literature on the concept of “state”, when 
this does not share the rational choice model preferred by economists
7
. Yet, this 
literature may offer useful insights. For example, a predominantly patrimonial state 
sets very different challenges for competition law enforcement and regulation, more 
broadly, than a neo-liberal or neo-corporatist one: one size does not fit all
8
. At the 
same time, it is important to acknowledge the different disciplinary and cultural 
identities of bureaucracies or “technocracies” involved in governmental decision 
making, and their evolution, in particular as competition law can also be envisioned as 
having always been (e.g. Europe) or having evolved to (e.g. United States) a 
technocratic discipline.
9
  
This chapter challenges the traditional antagonistic conception of the 
interaction between competition law and the State, by advancing the need to examine 
in depth the nature of government bureaucracies involved in decision-making and 
their respective claims for expertise and legitimacy. The analysis focuses on the 
context of a neo-liberal state, as it can provide useful insights on the erosion of the 
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state/markets binarity and the interaction of competition law with government 
activity. A different analysis may apply to other forms of states, but this is not within 
the scope of this study. 
 
I. Unveiling the concept of the State: government bureaucracy and the principle 
of competition in the neo-liberal tradition 
 
In a liberal state, the power of government to regulate market activity is limited: first, 
by a set of principles external to the government, such as the concept of natural law or 
the theory of the social contract between the sovereign and its subjects, from which 
basic rights were derived, thus delimiting “the domain of possible governmentality” 
from the domain of fundamental freedoms (on the basis of a “juridico-deductive 
approach”10); second, by the emergence of an internal rationality of governmental 
practice, in essence, the new discipline of political economy and the philosophy of 
utilitarianism. These new “technologies of government” set limitations on 
governmental reason by separating the sphere of intervention of public authorities 
from that of individual independence or autonomy, the foundations of the market 
system. 
 Yet, there is an essential difference between these two approaches: 
“(p)olitical economy reflects on governmental practices themselves, and it 
does not question them to determine whether or not they are legitimate in 
terms of right. It considers them in terms of their effects rather than their 
origins”.11 
Hence, governmental action is not only subject to the binary distinction of 
legitimate/not legitimate but also to the distinction of true/false, introduced by 
political economy, the market becoming a site of “veridiction-falsification” for 
governmental practice. This is based on the assumption that 
“ […] inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance with the natural 
mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth which enables us 
to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are 
erroneous.”12 
 Classical liberalism conceived the role of the state as supportive of the 
principle of individual autonomy; its only precept was for the state not to intervene, 
with the exception of rules guaranteeing some minimum standards for an equitable 
exchange (e.g. absence of fraud and coercion in contracts). Yet, the gradual building 
of a welfare state as a response to the social consequences of the Great Depression 
was the historical setting of this expansion of the role of government and led to some 
intense governmental intervention in the market. The neoclassical price theory of 
market failure and Keynesian economics were its intellectual backbones. But more 
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importantly, the rise of government bureaucracy offered the appropriate tool, the 
technology, for that expansion to occur. The role of government in markets is thus 
closely related to the development of the professional project of public bureaucracies, 
as the state has no essence other than “the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities”13 The State  is not a universal, nor is it an autonomous source of 
power.  It is only the "effect" of a "perpetual statification" of multiple organized 
practices (mentalities, rationalities, techniques and strategies) through which subjects 
are governed. The State should thus be viewed via the  analysis of practices of 
“governmentality”, hence our focus on government bureaucracies. 
The “technization” of the State through bureaucracy gave birth to a different 
form of legitimacy.
14
 Bureaucracy is based on hierarchical and functional 
organization, clearly defined areas of expertise, standard operating procedures, and 
fixed roles descriptions. The essential assumption of the bureaucratic form of 
organization is that bureaucrats identify their own interest and ideas with the 
organization of which they are part. Bureaucracy is thus perceived positively, a view 
profoundly linked to the image of professional expertise and political neutrality that is 
attached to it. As all large-scale organizations, the State tends to be bureaucratic in 
nature. The expansion of bureaucracy is thus inevitable and profoundly linked to the 
expansion of the State (in a chicken and egg way), as it is the only way of coping with 
the administrative requirements of large-scale social systems.  
One of the main characteristics of bureaucracy is the clear-cut hierarchy of 
authority, with a chain of command stretching from the top to the bottom, the 
existence of clear rules on the conduct of officials at all levels of government, the 
existence of a clear career path based on seniority, the separation from politics and 
ideology as the focus is on means and procedural rituals, rather than on policy 
outcomes. This contrasts with the heterarchical dimension of the “market”, where 
individual entrepreneurs enjoy property rights on the means of production and 
compete with each other. This analysis may apply to both administrative 
(government) and industrial (private sector) bureaucracies, which present some 
common characteristics, although the first one benefits from a total absence of 
competition, because of the monopoly power enjoyed by the government and the 
development of a professional public bureaucracy, not subject to the vagaries of 
electoral or party competition. 
In conclusion, bureaucracy is seen as an essential step in the re-
conceptualization of the role of the state, according to the principle of rationality. It is 
perceived as a form of sophisticated technology enabling the state to intervene and 
regulate markets. In one of his classic texts, Max Weber notes: 
“Bureaucracy offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the 
principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective 
considerations. Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who 
have specialized training and who by constant practice learn more and more. 
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The „objective discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business 
according to calculable rules and „without regard for persons‟”.15 
This positive view of bureaucracy is intrinsically linked not only to the 
expansion of government‟s role in various areas, until then managed by market 
activity only, but also to the reinforcement of the institutional apparatus of the state, 
with the establishment of either central ministerial departments or of independent 
administrative agencies, during the same period, and in some jurisdictions of a 
specialized judiciary to deal with issues arising from the normative activity of state 
bureaucraties
16. In other words, the expansion of government‟s role in markets would 
not have been possible in the absence of the “technology” of professional public 
bureaucracy.   
 Yet, this positive account of bureaucracy was soon to be challenged by 
functionalist sociologists, such as Merton, Selznick and Crozier, among others. 
Merton emphasized the “dysfunctions of bureaucracy”, stemming from bureaucratic 
ritualism and emphasis on procedures rather than on underlying organizational 
goals.
17
  Based on the “human relations approach to bureaucracy”, Merton 
acknowledged the limits of Weber‟s ideal type, as the discipline necessary for 
obtaining the kind of standardized behaviour required in a bureaucratic organization 
may ultimately lead to a displacement of goals. This inflexibility of bureaucratic 
organizations and their over-specialisation impedes bureaucrats from innovating and 
from responding creatively to new challenges. The “vicious circle” of 
bureaucratization is further reinforced through a mechanism of co-optation and the 
diffusion of a special ideology securing the necessary minimum of conformity and 
loyalty to the organization.
18
 Crozier notes how the bureaucratic system of 
organization “is not only a  system that does not correct its behaviour in view of its 
errors, it is also too rigid to adjust without crisis to the transformations that the 
accelerated evolution of industrial society makes more and more imperative”.19 
 These criticisms of the bureaucratic state became even more pronounced with 
the emergence of neo-liberalism. It is possible to distinguish between two trends in 
neo-liberal thought, for the purposes of this short text: first, the development, partly in 
parallel with the theory of market failure, of the theory of government failure in 
welfare economics; second, the emergence in Germany of the ordo-liberal model of 
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neo-liberalism, which has profoundly marked the intellectual foundations of the 
European economic integration project. 
The first story is too well known to be developed in detail: to Ronald Coase‟s 
virulent criticism of Pigou‟s theory of externalities, suggesting that the assessment of 
the performance of different institutions (firms, markets, regulation) should involve 
the comparison of alternative institutional arrangements, public choice theorists added 
the analysis of government from a rational choice perspective: “(g)overnment, like the 
market in a pure exchange economy, is viewed simply as an institution for 
aggregating or balancing individual demands for public policies”.20 The implications 
of these two standpoints for government intervention in the economy are devastating. 
Once the supply of government policies is viewed as a proper market, the mechanisms 
of collective choice are built upon the following three articulations: (i) voters make 
political decisions in order to maximize their utility; (ii) lawmakers seek to maximize 
the votes they obtain and stay in office and (iii) voters are rational ignorants, as given 
that voting and informing oneself about policy is costly and that the benefit derived 
from an individual vote is zero, it is rational for them to remain uninformed about 
public policy.
21
 In view of the collective action problem for diffused and large group 
interests, smaller groups are more likely to win rents from the government and to 
capture policymakers. Consequently, regulation does not promote the public interest 
but the goals of powerful interest groups. The analysis has been transposed to non-
directly elected regulators, such as the executive (bureaucracy) and judicial branches 
of government, which, it has been noted, offer a more durable form of protection.
22
  
The standard model relies on the fact that the nonmarket nature of 
government‟s outputs leads to a measurement problem, as it is not possible to define, 
as in a market system, the number of units of output produced as such, but only to 
report the level of activities, from which output levels may be inferred. This leads to a 
monitoring problem, where the purchaser of public services, e.g. the government 
operating as the agent of all citizens, cannot observe and thus monitor the bureaucrat‟s 
efficiency. This information asymmetry, because of the bureaucrat‟s expertise over 
his real costs, might be exploited by the bureaucrat, should he operate, as it is often 
the case, as a monopolist supplier. Indeed, the monopoly nature of most public service 
providers frees them from the competition process and does not enable the 
government (and thus ultimately the citizens) to dispose of an alternative source of 
information over the real costs of the provision of public services. The incentives of 
the bureaucrat are thus by nature in opposition to the public interest. As the 
bureaucrat‟s salaries are unrelated to improved efficiency, because of the monitoring 
problem, the bureaucrat does not pursue, as private business managers, profits but 
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essentially non-pecuniary goals, the maximization of budget size and/or the expansion 
of the bureau‟s personnel and tasks, both leading to organizational slack and wasteful 
duplication of competences.
23
 Empirical studies have examined the comparative cost 
structures of private firms operating in a competitive environment and public 
monopolies, or undertakings partly controlled by the state, and found that the latter 
provided the fixed output demanded by the community at a higher cost than 
necessary.
24
  
Yet, empirical evidence is inconclusive on the ability of citizens to control 
effectively government and bureaucracy and the possibility for democratic 
competition to produce “efficiency levels comparable to those achieved by market 
competition”.25 Furthermore, most of the empirical backing of the public choice 
theory relies on correlations between some limited variables indicating capture to 
infer causation, without a proper falsifiable analysis of the impact of other variables 
than capture on the regulatory outcomes, such as ideology or structural and 
demographic characteristics.
26
 Finally, public choice theory mostly assumes a 
monopolistic setting with regard to the provision of public services,
27
 without taking 
stock of electoral competition in democratic politics, and also competition coming 
from other institutions than the government, such as the not-for-profit sector, religious 
organizations, unions, corporations, families.
28
  
The second is the ordoliberal version of neo-liberalism, particularly influential 
in Europe. Born in Germany in the 1930s, ordoliberalism was opposed to any variant 
of planned state interventionism, in whatever form: Bismarckian state socialism, Nazi 
autarchic planification or Keynesian-style interventionism. Attacking New Deal 
programmes or the Beveridge plan as symbols of the welfare state, ordoliberal authors 
emphasized the risks of state management of the economy, thus adhering partly to the 
government failure theory but also to the idea that the distinction between the 
“market” and the “state” is intellectually sterile. They advanced instead market 
economy as the principle and model for the State, which should be organized on the 
basis of the principle of competition.
29
 The research programme of the ordoliberals 
has been nicely summarized by Foucault: 
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“Since it turns out that the state is the bearer of intrinsic defects, let‟s ask the 
market economy itself to be the principle, not of the state‟s limitations [as was 
the case in the liberal model], but of its internal regulation from start to finish 
of its existence and action. In other words, instead of accepting a free market 
defined by the state and kept as it were under state supervision – which was, in 
a way, the initial formula of liberalism: let us establish a space of economic 
freedom and let us circumscribe it by a state that will supervise it – the 
ordoliberals say we should completely turn the formula around and adopt the 
free market as organizing and regulating principle of the state, from the start of 
its existence up to the last form of its interventions. In other words: a state 
under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the 
state”.30 
 According to Foucault, ordoliberalism relied on three major shifts from the old 
liberal tradition: (i) a shift from the concept of exchange (which limited the role of the 
State to ensure respect for the freedom of those involved in the exchange, on the basis 
of the principle of laissez-faire) to that of competition (the state actively intervening 
in order to prevent a distortion of competition and the creation of monopolies); (ii) a 
shift from the perception of competition as a natural and pre-existing given to a view 
of complete competition as “an historical objective of governmental art”, to be 
actively pursued by the state; (iii) a shift from the view of the relation between 
competition and the state as reciprocally delimited areas to that of a “complete 
superimposition of market mechanisms, indexed to competition, and governmental 
policy”, the market constituting the “general index in which one must place the rule 
for defining all governmental action”.31 The relation between competition/markets 
and the state is thus reversed, in comparison to the liberal model, without, however, 
leading to a new form of laissez-faire. It is important to understand here that the 
ordoliberal version of neo-liberalism argues that the competitive market order should 
be integrated at the constitutional level, and not at the sub-constitutional level, that of 
choosing policies. This constitutional dimension requires the institutional framing of 
market processes: the market being transformed into a constitutional order. Contrary 
to welfare economics, ordoliberal authors aim to enforce a competitive order in an 
indirect manner, framing the rules of the game, rather than seeking to improve the 
outcomes directly by way of specific interventions into the economic process.
32
 
 
II. Implications on the relation between government activity and the principle of 
competition: the role of bureaucracy 
 
These different traditions of neo-liberalism may have different implications for the 
relation between government activity and competition. If one adopts a public choice 
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perspective, it is possible to argue that any form of state intervention in the 
marketplace carries the risk of capture and inefficiency: there is a wealth of empirical 
literature on the inefficiency of sector specific regulations, but similar claims have 
also been made with regard to competition law.
33
 The burden of proof is on the State 
to establish the need of its intervention through competition law, and the standard of 
proof is set high, on the assumption that the self-correcting mechanism of the market 
will take care of any eventual failure, in the absence of state interference. Such an 
approach leads essentially to subject state intervention to a stricter competition 
assessment than private action, as by essence the monolithic (and monopolistic) 
nature of government intervention departs more from the optimum of competitive 
markets (and the standard of perfect competition) than even concentrated private 
market structures. Yet, it is also clear that from this perspective the field left to 
competition law versus other forms of state intervention remains open for negotiation, 
a negotiation conducted through and according to the rules of the communicating tool 
of economics. As a result, of a greater recourse to social sciences in public policy, the 
erosion of traditional divisions of labour and the emergence of risk society, 
bureaucracy sees also its role change, as it is gradually transformed from a rigid 
structure performing merely tasks of execution to a more pro-active technocracy, 
assuming tasks of forecast, knowledge gathering/sharing and communication with the 
public. 
It is important here to reflect on the implications that each form of state 
intervention, for example antitrust versus regulation, entails to the general claims of 
expertise and “technicization” that have built bureaucratic legitimacy, on which 
ultimately rests government‟s authority to intervene in the marketplace. Ministerial 
departments and regulators often dispose of superior expertise on the characteristics 
and problems of the industries they supervise, than competition authorities or courts, 
which are by essence of generalist nature, dealing ad hoc with a plethora of cases 
across different sectors. This is due to superior technical skills (for example a telecom 
regulator understands interconnection better than an antitrust authority), superior 
expertise and information (as a result of their systematic activity in the sector), but 
also because of different disciplinary communities and values represented by these 
regulators, thus capturing a more diverse set of citizens‟ and consumers‟ preferences 
(e.g. environmental regulators often value more the protection of the environment 
than the protection of competition). In principle, the sector-specific regulators should 
be better placed to assess the welfare effects of their interventions on consumers and 
citizens, with the exception, of course, of circumstances where they remain 
“captured” by the specific interests they are supposed to regulate. However, a similar 
claim can be made to a certain extent also for competition authorities, thus indicating 
that from a public choice perspective, the two situations constitute, in practice, 
functional equivalents. Hence, if there is any claim for an antitrust authority to 
intervene and control some other form of state activity, this can only happen, under 
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this approach of neo-liberalism, because of the superior expertise of the antitrust 
authority on matters relating to the regulation of markets and competition, in essence 
economic expertise, or their independence from the other sectors of government 
bureaucracy.
34
 This is not the place to expand on the important role and continued 
presence of economists in government bureaucracies, although there are significant 
differences across jurisdictions that may justify different approaches in the interaction 
between competition law and government action.
35
 In any case, with the probable 
exception of public utilities‟ regulators, competition authorities have been one of the 
first venues in government bureaucracy, at least in Europe and in the United States, 
where a high level of economic expertise has been progressively developed, either in 
house or contracted out to the market of professional experts. Competition authorities 
claim, on average, more expertise than other government departments in competition 
law analysis. This configuration should lead to an expansion of the scope of 
competition law and advocacy, with the exception of instances where the specific 
industry requires some superior form of economic expertise, which antitrust 
authorities do not possess, in view of the specific characteristics of the industry. In 
such rare cases, sector-specific regulation may benefit from antitrust immunity.
36
  
In contrast, in the ordoliberal model, competition is a value to be preserved as 
such, whatever the circumstances and outcomes. This comes out of the constitutional 
dimension of the principle of market economy. Thus, considerations about the 
superior technical expertise of government departments and regulators have no place 
in the analysis of the appropriate scope of competition law intervention versus some 
other regulatory action. The European Treaties constitute an illustration of this 
constitutional dimension of the competition principle. Article 3(1)g of the former 
Treaty of European Communities recognized the vital importance of establishing „a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted‟. The Court of 
Justice relied on this provision to apply the principle of competition to State measures 
in a number of cases.
37
 The Court has placed particular emphasis on Article 3(1)g 
when confronted with a conflict between competition rules and other EU policies and 
objectives
38
 and has pronounced, on the basis of this provision, that competition law 
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constitutes a „fundamental objective of the Community‟.39 Finally, the Court referred 
to this article when it granted to national competition authorities the power to set aside 
provisions of domestic legislation that jeopardize the effet utile of EU competition 
law.
40
  
The existence of a specific provision emphasizing the role of competition law 
in the text of the “Principles” part of the founding Treaties led to specific implications 
as to the interpretation of this provision and its relationship with other Community 
activities. This was reinforced by Article 4 of the Treaty on the European 
Communities, which was introduced by a Treaty revision in 1992, adding a new joint 
action of the Community and the member states: the “adoption of an economic policy, 
which is based on the close coordination of Member States‟ economic policies […] 
and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition”. The scope of the competition principle was thus extended beyond the 
narrow confines of the competences of the Community (although these were already 
broadly defined): the member states should also be inspired by this principle in 
conducting their economic policies. Although Article 3 of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) does not refer any more to the principle of „undistorted competition‟ or 
“free competition”, following the suggestions made by former President Sarkozy of 
France, Article 3(3) TEU provides that the Union shall establish an internal market 
with the goal to achieve “a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress”. In addition, according to Protocol n. 27, “the 
Internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted”. It is too early to assess the impact of the textual 
modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, but it seems in general that despite 
the introduction of the concept of “social market economy” and some horizontal 
clauses in the European Treaties requiring the consideration of environmental and 
social policy impacts for Union policies, the principle of free competition remains a 
primary objective governing all action of the Union.
41
 This constitutional dimension 
implies that in the presence of a conflict between regulation enacted by the Union or 
its Member States and the principle of free competition, the latter should take 
precedence, irrespective of the degree of (economic) expertise of the national or EU 
bureaucracy implementing the regulation. For example, in subsequent cases, the 
European Courts have affirmed the absence of any competition law immunity for 
sector-specific regulation, thus adopting a completely opposite perspective than the 
US Supreme Court.
42
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The strategy of integrating the value of competition at all levels of government 
intervention, because of its constitutional status, had also implications on the 
organization of the provision of public services across the Member States of the EU. 
National approaches and styles diverge and are still exercising a powerful symbolic 
and rhetorical, if not any more legally binding, influence (because of extensive EU 
harmonization). For example, the French concept of service public has served for a 
long time as a battle-cry against the expansion of the competition law provisions of 
the European Treaties to the public sphere, as it has been given, at least subliminally, 
an organic (service public should be provided by public bodies) versus a material 
(universal service can be dispensed by public and private bodies) meaning. The slight 
move towards a less conflicting terminology in the Treaties and secondary legislation, 
with the concept of “services of general economic interest”, cannot dissimulate that 
tensions remain high.
43
 For the proponents of service public, its domain is mutually 
excludable from that of competition law, as any expansion of the scope of competition 
law will lead to an automatic restriction of the scope of service public. The 
introduction of specific competition law provisions for public undertakings or the 
recognition of the right of citizens to receive public services illustrate that the two 
principles as perceived as antagonistic to each other.
44
  
On the contrary, the British experience on the interaction of government with 
the competition principle has been different. The monolithic welfare state that 
emerged from the Beveridge plan in the 1950s and 1960s was subject to the neo-
liberal cure of liberalization and privatization during the Thatcher era in the 1980s and 
to “third way” management in the 1990s and 2000s. A key objective of New Public 
Management was to achieve a “post-bureaucratic” government, where the 
introduction of purchaser/provider separation, the creation of quasi-markets, 
outsourcing and user control would allow multiple forms of provision to be developed 
in order to create more competition amongst potential providers.
45
 The recent White 
book Open Public Services of the coalition government in the UK and subsequent 
legislation adopted or in preparation also aim to introduce consumer choice and 
                                                                                                                                            
Interaction, in Handbook on European Competition Law, Vol. 2, (forth. Damien Geradin & Ioannis 
Lianos ed. 2013). SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044722 
43
 See, more recently, the adoption of the Services of General Economic Interest Package by the 
European Commission in April 2012 regarding the conciliation between the competition law provisions 
of the Treaty and the provision of services of general interest: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei.html. 
44
 See, Article 106 TFEU, subjecting public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive 
rights to the application of the general competition law provisions of the Treaty “in so far as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks 
assigned to them (services of general economic interest)”. Non-market services (compulsory education, 
social protection, etc.) and sovereign tasks (such as security, justice) are also excluded from the scope 
of competition law, following the case law of the European Courts. Article 14 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union acknowledges the place occupied by services of general economic 
interest among the shared values of the Union, thus balancing the constitutional dimension of the 
competition law provisions. Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, now binding, confirms 
the importance of Article 14 TFEU and acknowledges the need for Union citizens to have access to 
services of general economic interest. 
45
 Kenneth Kernaghan, The post-bureaucratic organization and public service values, 66(1) 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 91 (2000). 
14 
 
competition in the provision of services by opening public services to a range of 
providers, not only from the public sector, but also coming from the voluntary and 
private sector. The White Book goes as far as to declare that “(a)part from those 
public services where the Government has a special reason to operate a monopoly 
(e.g. the military) every public service should be open so that, in line with people‟s 
demands, services can be delivered by a diverse range of providers”.46 This will be 
achieved by having suppliers from the private and voluntary sectors entering the 
public procurement process, providers competing with one another to deliver services 
directly to individuals armed with personal budgets and entitlements or the power of 
choice, and the full development of a voluntary, community and social enterprise 
(VCSE) sector, accountable to local communities, and thus to democratic electoral 
competition.
47
 Following these proposals, the provision of most government services 
in the UK would be organized according to the principle of free competition. While 
the approach does not share the constitutional dimension of the German ordoliberal 
perspective and its‟ rules-based approach (it is more outcomes-oriented), they both 
follow a similar direction.  
In conclusion, a bureaucracy-centred theory of competition law and the state 
interaction will be simultaneously more context aware and empirically focused than 
current approaches. First, at the macro-level, it becomes important to analyze the 
value structure foundations on which competition law enforcement is built by looking 
to the degree of intrusion of neo-liberal values in the design and operation of public 
powers. Modern bureaucracy is more knowledge-based and outcome oriented than the 
Weberian description of it as a mere technical, rational, administrative routine-style 
implementation of public policies decided elsewhere. Second, at the micro-level, the 
knowledge base, the skills and the disciplinary/professional background of 
government bureaucracies needs to be explored in depth, before concluding on the 
appropriate method of interaction with authorities entrusted with the implementation 
of competition law norms (competition authorities and courts). The level of 
development of the competition law regime and, of course, the intrinsic quality of 
government bureaucracies, their sources of wisdom and their ability to produce 
efficient policies, are also among the elements to take into account. 
 
III. Case studies on the interaction between the principle of competition and 
government action in a neo-liberal state 
 
What are the implications of the transformation of public action in a neo-
liberal state for the application of competition law to government intervention in 
markets? To respond to this question, I will examine two case studies illustrating two 
possible strategies of interaction between the principle of competition and government 
action in a neo-liberal state. First, the tendency to subject all types of state action to 
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the discipline of competition may be systematized by the establishment of a 
prophylactic ex ante competition screening of all proposed laws and regulations. 
Second, competition in the provision of services of general interest should be 
adequately managed so as to produce the best possible outcomes from a public policy 
perspective. Hence, competition may only be introduced for some parameters (e.g. 
quality) but excluded for others (e.g. price). The traditional analytical framework of 
competition law will need in this case to be adjusted, to reflect the proper balance 
between the different aims pursued by government action.  The UK managed-
competition system in the healthcare services sector will provide an illustration of 
how this balancing operates in practice.  
 
A. Introducing competition screening in regulatory impact assessments 
 
In recent years many countries have introduced the tool of ex ante competition 
assessment in the process of evaluating draft new laws, regulations or policies. 
Sometimes, this competition screening is integrated in the general system of 
regulatory impact assessments; in other cases it has an autonomous existence.  
The OECD has prepared a competition checklist, in the context of its 
“Competition Assessment Toolkit”, suggesting a detailed competition analysis of a 
policy proposal should it have any of the following four effects: (i) setting limits to 
the number or range of suppliers, (ii) limiting the ability of suppliers to compete, for 
example by reducing their ability to set prices, advertise or market their goods, or 
raising their costs, (iii) reducing their incentive to compete by creating a self-
regulatory or co-regulatory regime, or increasing transparency over the outputs, 
prices, sales or costs of the suppliers by requesting the publication of information and 
(iv) limiting the choices and information available to consumers.
48
 If the proposal 
affects one of these parameters, a detailed, more comprehensive competition 
assessment should be undertaken, by looking to the regulatory proposal‟s impact on 
the main determinants of competitive pressures for the market in question (e.g. the 
existence of coordinated effects or reduced incentives to innovation). This assessment 
involves the definition of a relevant market. The proposed regulatory design should be 
considered in a comparative context in which alternative means of achieving the 
regulatory objective that are less restrictive of competition are identified and assessed. 
If these are not found, then a comparison should be made of the costs and benefits of 
the proposal, the latter being adopted “only if that comparison shows that, after taking 
into account the costs of the anti-competitive impact the assessment identified, the 
proposal‟s enactment will yield a net benefit”.49 A similar approach is also taken in 
other jurisdictions.
50
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Some jurisdictions have put in place more general regulatory impact assessment 
(RIA) procedures in order to examine the impact of proposed regulation and 
legislation on a number of variables, including economic, social, environmental, and 
health effects, the competition screening process being, in some cases, cited as one 
variable among others. For example, the Impact Assessment Guidelines of the 
European Commission include competition screening as one of the various economic 
impacts that RIA routinely explore.
51
 This integration of the competition assessment 
tool into the broader RIA analysis raises questions on the possible links between the 
two procedures. First, the OECD Competition Toolkit notes that RIA takes a more 
static approach, comparing likely outcomes based on the existing economic and 
regulatory environment, while competition assessments are more future oriented, 
taking a dynamic efficiency approach, and focus on the effects of the proposal on 
consumer choice, rather than on the economy and public policy in general.
52
 
However, it is not clear how different are these tools in practice and how much 
competition assessment has been integrated in RIA analysis (see Table 1). 
Competition authorities and courts have already been using cost-benefit analysis 
techniques in assessing ex post the competitive impact of various forms of 
regulation.
53
 One could finally argue that competition assessment is based upon 
competition/Industrial Organization economics methodologies whereas Regulatory 
Impact Assessments tend to use a broader set of methodologies. Yet, the possibility of 
cross-fertilization and intensive borrowing between the two techniques should not be 
underestimated, now that regulatory impact assessments procedures become more 
systematic at the EU and national levels. 
 
Table 1: The place of competition impact assessments in regulatory impact 
assessments in the EU
54
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Competition Assessment in EU's RIAs
Total Number ofIAs analysed: 690
484
206
no Competition Assessment
Competition Assessment
 
 
Second, the institutional framework of RIA and that of the competition screening 
might be different. Although it is recognized that the assessment should be performed 
by the “frontline” government departments developing the proposal, under the review 
of an external party, most frequently an Impact Assessment Board, usually these 
bodies lack, in general, competition expertise. Competition authorities have a role to 
play: (i) in reviewing any proposal with potential effects on competition (as part of 
their competition advocacy mission) and making (binding or non binding) 
recommendations,
55
 (ii) in engaging in ex ante consultations with the “frontline” 
government department performing the RIA,
56
 (iii) in adopting guidelines for 
policymakers detailing how competition screening should be performed and 
integrated in RIAs,
57
 (iv) and in providing advice and training to policy makers at any 
stage of the process.
58
  
Nonetheless, the generalization of the competition screening of draft regulations 
and laws, as part of the RIA procedures, will inevitably erode the differential of 
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expertise from which now benefit competition authorities, in comparison to 
“frontline” government departments. Once the “culture” of competition assessment is 
integrated across government bureaucracies, and internal expertise in the form of 
departmental specialists (lawyers and mainly economists) gets fully developed, the 
integration of the competition screening in the RIA tool would be complete. Certainly, 
there are arguments for maintaining an independent institutional voice for competition 
inside government bureaucracies, but in a neo-liberal State this institutional 
complexity might not offer much and in, some cases, might even be counter-
productive, as the independence of competition authorities might make them 
ineffective competition advocates, in particular in situation of crisis, hence the need to 
establish also advocates for competition within and not only outside government 
bureaucracy.
59
 
In conclusion, the integration of competition screening in RIA challenges the view 
that competition and government action are antithetical to each other and marks the 
evolution towards a complete integration of the competition principle across 
government bureaucracies. 
 
B. The emergence of a new style of competition law for government services: 
managed competition in the healthcare sector in the UK 
 
The British National Health Service (NHS) was subject to major reforms since the 
introduction of quasi-markets into the delivery of public services and the separation of 
the funding and provision role of the state in the national health system in 1989.
60
 
This market-oriented approach aimed to reduce costs without public cuts in 
entitlements. Its main aim was to respond to concerns that NHS bureaucracy was 
inefficient by introducing competition in the provision of publicly-funded healthcare. 
When the state acts as a funder, it purchases services from a variety of private, 
voluntary and public providers, all operating in competition with each other. These 
“quasi-markets” replace monopolistic state providers with competitive independents 
ones (initially public providers, and since 2008, private or non-profit ones), but to the 
difference of conventional markets, on the supply side, the providers competing with 
each other do not necessarily aim to maximize profits, nor are they privately owned, 
and on the demand side, purchasing decisions are not made by the patients, but by a 
third party, acting as an intermediary (in England, since 2011, so called Clinical 
Commissioning Groups formed by general practitioners (GPs)). In 2006, the 
government (National Health Service Act) introduced reforms giving patients a choice 
over where they received care and introduced non-price competition among public 
hospitals and among the latter and private (also voluntary sector) providers in order to 
deliver secondary care to publicly funded (through taxation) patients.
61
 Hence, 
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referred NHS patients (by their GPs) for elective care are offered a choice of four or 
more providers registered with the Care Quality Commission “willing” to provide 
services at the NHS (State administered) tariffs. These are based on a prospective 
payment system, known as Payment by Results (PbR), where the hospital fee is 
determined by the government on the basis mainly of patients‟ diagnoses with some 
other adjustments. Public hospitals are organized, since the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012, in NHS Foundation Trusts, which benefit from extensive independence 
from the Department of Health, and are jointly licensed by two independent 
regulators, Monitor (economic regulator) and the Care Quality Commission (quality 
standards). 
How competition takes place in these “quasi-markets”, in view of State funding? 
As the funding follows patients around the system, introducing patient choice creates 
financial incentives for providers to compete for market share.
62
 Since a regulator sets 
the prices, healthcare providers compete over non-price dimensions to attract patients. 
There is empirical evidence that competition on quality, when the administered price 
is set at the right level, generates significant benefits for the patients and thus provides 
better value for money for tax-payers.
63
 As the regulated price is generally set above 
the providers‟ marginal costs, the most efficient providers will have the financial 
incentives to increase the quality of their services, until their profits approach zero. 
But would a public or non-profit provider be responsive to these financial incentives, 
at least as a private provider would, if there is no proper profit to be made? 
Subsequent reforms were necessary in order to enable senior management to be 
responsive to financial incentives: first, the hospital remuneration was organized in 
annual block contracts paying for the use of the hospital‟s facilities for a range of 
services to predefined populations; second, hospitals were progressively allowed to 
retain surpluses and their financial situation was subject to central government‟s 
control, which still has the power to remove senior management of hospitals in 
deficit; third, patients should be offered an adequate environment to exercise choice 
and be responsive to quality signals; fourth, intermediaries such as the Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, should be also offered financial incentives and autonomy in 
order to ensure that patients are elastic to quality and exercise their choice diligently. 
With these reforms, state bureaucracies were subject to the discipline of the 
competitive process.
64
 Similar reforms have been initiated in various other Member 
States of the EU. 
The introduction of competition and choice in the mixed market of secondary care 
(where profit and non-profit providers are present), in conjunction with the 
administered price system, raises the question of the application of competition law in 
this peculiar setting. It is clear that for competition to work, a broad duty of 
competitive neutrality should be imposed, encompassing the need to clarify if and 
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how competition law may apply in this context.
65
 The issue has generated discussion, 
in view of the requirement in EU, as well as UK, competition law that the entity to 
which competition law applies should be an “undertaking”: that is an entity exercising 
an economic activity, the latter concept defining the scope of competition law.
66
 Some 
authors advance the view that public hospitals providing their services for free and 
funded by the state should not be considered as “undertakings”, and thus competition 
law should not apply to them, while others argue that they are “undertakings” and 
competition law applies.
67
 
From a legal perspective, there are two problems with the application of 
competition law in this context: first, the case law of the European Courts provides 
clearly that where an organisation purchases goods, not for the purpose of offering 
goods and services as part of an economic activity, but in order to use them in the 
context of a different activity, such as an activity of a purely social nature, then it is 
not acting as an undertaking simply because it is a purchaser of those goods.
68
 In this 
context, the public hospital‟s services are purchased by the NHS, under the direction 
of the Department of Health, for the social purpose of providing universal healthcare, 
funded by tax revenues (a compulsory way of funding). Second, proponents of the 
application of competition law advance that, at least for some of the health services, 
public hospitals can potentially make profit, and be qualified as undertakings.
69
 Yet, 
transposing the concept of “profit” in a non-profit setting is a difficult endeavour. As 
it was previously explained, the financial incentives provided to public hospitals for 
inducing them to compete do not relate to monetary profits, but to mainly 
bureaucratic-related incentives (e.g. the possibility for senior management to keep 
their position, the aggrandizement of their budget or, since the enactment of the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 and its new insolvency provisions treating public 
and private providers in the same way if they fail, the possibility to keep their public 
status, as “failed” and debt-hit NHS Foundation Trusts may pass to private 
management).  
At best, there is some ambiguity in the possibility to apply competition law, in 
which case other principles, public policy or institutional matters may influence the 
choice of the adequate interpretative option. From a public policy perspective, the 
non-application of competition law to non-profit hospitals, whereas private providers 
are subject to it, may introduce an anomaly, at least with regard to the application of  
the competitive neutrality principle, as public and private providers compete for 
patients, and private providers are able to make monetary profits.
70
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However, from an institutional perspective, enforcing general competition law in 
this context might be problematic.  
First, competition authorities and (to a certain degree courts) with the mandate to 
enforce competition law, have expertise in applying competition law principles but no 
expertise or mandate on issues relating to the health and safety of patients. Their 
mission-oriented role--preserving the competitive process--may also influence their 
setting of priorities between the value of competition and other values, such as 
integrated care, which might be of importance to patients. As a recent OECD 
secretariat report reminds us, the competitive process allows an efficient allocation of 
resources, irrespective of the underlying set of preferences. Yet it might also result in 
undesirable outcomes with regard to the care received by patients.
71
 Hence, it should 
be considered as an instrument for the provision of high quality healthcare, rather than 
as an end in itself. 
Second, the provision of effective healthcare requires the cooperation of different 
providers across but also at the same level of the healthcare chain. In order to ensure a 
seamless health service to patients and economies to the taxpayer, providers and 
commissioners must exchange the necessary information about ways to improve 
patient safety and joint research and development. Joint purchasing and cooperation 
may also sometimes be necessary in order to disseminate and launch innovations 
faster. In a competitive and segmented healthcare market, there is a risk that care will 
be fragmented and that one provider will not always know what another provider has 
done, leaving the patients to sort out how and when to deal with different providers 
for different elements of their care. Cooperation between providers is thus essential 
for enabling integrated care. 
Due to their generalist nature, competition authorities or courts are not, however, 
well placed to develop the technical expertise and acquire necessary information to 
guarantee the preservation of integrated care, nor are they generally ready to accept 
that cooperation might in some cases be more important than competition. It thus 
becomes essential to entrust the application of competition law principles to a sector-
specific regulator. In the UK, Monitor has extensive competence in ensuring the right 
balance between cooperation and competition, with the assistance of the Competition 
and Cooperation Panel. The new Health and Social Care Act 2012 makes clear that 
Monitor‟s core duty is that patient interests always come first and that where an 
integrated service raises competition concerns, Monitor will focus on what benefits 
patients, its role being to ensure that the benefits to patients outweigh any negative 
effects to competition, and that any negatives are kept to a minimum.
72
  
Finally, the concept of “restriction of competition” in the healthcare quasi-markets 
and the cost-benefit analysis to be performed differ from those employed in 
competition law. First, the restriction of competition relates to harm to patients 
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(reduced patient choice for NHS-funded services) and taxpayers from lower quality 
services, although in some limited circumstances they might also have some effect on 
prices, for non-routine elective services.
73
 Second, benefits to be taken into account in 
order to outweigh the existence of a “restriction of competition” in this sector do not 
always take the form of the usual cost and quality efficiency gains of competition law. 
Certainly, economies of scale and scope lowering short-run variable costs, the 
increase of patient volumes (the “output” to maximize) or procedures reducing 
transaction costs are benefits to consumers that are usually taken into account in 
general competition law. But other factors, such as improved recruitment and 
retention of staff, better information, shared clinical working practices or seamless 
patient care might not be easily transposable in the context of general competition 
law. It becomes therefore clear that a different institutional and/or, to some extent, 
substantive law setting is needed in order to enforce competition law principles in this 
peculiar setting. 
For this reason, prior to the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the UK made the 
choice of a specific competition law regime, applying to all commissioners and 
providers of NHS-funded services, irrespective of whether they are public, private or 
third sector organizations. These Principles and Rules for cooperation and 
competition (PRCC) are not legally binding provisions enforceable by courts; they are 
inspired by general competition law, but at the same time emphasize a number of 
other parameters of essence for the promotion of competition in these quasi-markets, 
such as rules for the commissioning and procurement of health services, the 
transparency and fairness of the payment regimes, the duty of commissioners and 
providers to cooperate in order to deliver seamless and sustainable care to patients, or 
rules regulating promotional activity. A Competition and Cooperation Panel (CCP) 
was also set to provide advice on matters of compliance with the PRCC and has since 
adopted extensive guidelines on the interpretation of the PRCC with regard to conduct 
and merger cases.
74
  
Following the enactment of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the CCP will be 
integrated in Monitor, the healthcare economic regulator, which is also entrusted with 
the power to apply general competition law concurrently with the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT). Hence, general competition law will apply to the health care sector, 
although through a different institutional framework than non-regulated sectors with 
the concurrent jurisdiction of both the sector economic regulator and the competition 
authority.
75
 How would the interaction between these two competition authorities 
work in practice? The broad duties of the Monitor will inevitably weight in the 
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decision-making process and may lead to different outcomes than a situation where 
the OFT would be involved on its own.
76
 Focusing on the different values, 
competences and methodologies used by the respective bureaucracies and on how 
these could complement each other in the enforcement of competition law in this 
sector might offer a better predictive tool of their interaction than a normative theory 
on the relations between sector-specific regulators and competition authorities or 
courts. In a neo-liberal state, where competition is a value underpinning any form of 
state action, the exact place of other values becomes a matter for continuous 
negotiation between different segments of public bureaucracy. These rely on their 
expertise/epistemic competence on the substantive issues of the policy area to which 
they intervene, rather than on their general bureaucratic competence or procedures 
and administrative routines, as would have been the case in the traditional (Weberian) 
view of bureaucracy. For example, the CCP relies in its decision-making process on 
the input of two groups of experts: the clinical reference group, composed by experts 
in public health and medicine, which provide advice on health and safety issues, and 
the economics reference group, comprising experts in health economics and 
competition, consulting on competition economics and analytical 
techniques/methodologies. This expertise is more extensive than that usually received 
by competition authorities (which mainly focus on the economics of industrial 
organization)
77
. 
 
C. The need for a comparative institutional analysis 
 
In essence, it becomes necessary to conduct a comparative institutional analysis
78
 
focusing on the respective expertise, among other criteria, of each bureaucracy 
(competition authority or sector specific regulator) before concluding on the 
appropriate interaction between these different institutions. Ministerial departments, 
sector-specific regulators and competition authorities constitute all imperfect 
alternatives, the question being which alternative is best (for welfare – the underlying 
aim of state intervention in a neo-liberal state), given the real world of high 
information cost and the fragmentation of expertise (over different dimensions of 
welfare). The tool of comparative institutional analysis provides some solution to this 
choice between imperfect alternatives. 
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This is particularly the case in the UK, where sector specific regulators proceed to 
a concurrent application of competition law, along with their other duties and hence 
making an institutional choice does not amount to a choice between regulation and 
competition law. Both can be efficiently combined. Hence, the efficacy of the 
competition authority should not be presumed for all regulatory “transactions” aiming 
to promote competition and welfare, but be subject to a comparative analysis of 
alternative institutions, some of which are sector specific regulators or self-regulatory 
bodies. The possibility of capture should of course be factored in the comparative 
institutional analysis, yet its effect should not be overestimated. As Oliver Williamson 
has rightly observed, “even if the benefits of regulation decline over time and go 
negative, the discounted present value may remain positive”79. The proximity of the 
goals of sector specific regulators to those of government departments (as they are by 
definition wider than the simple preservation of a competitive market, which is the 
main task of a competition authority) may enable some degree of economization of 
administrative and regulatory costs, following the integration of different goals within 
a unified framework of rules or standards for undertakings to comply with. Quite 
often the tasks of ministerial departments or sector specific regulators are not only to 
regulate market failures or market imperfections (which is close to the tasks 
performed by competition authorities), but also to proceed to some re-distributional 
transactions (e.g. public service obligations), the latter being a highly politicized area 
of government activity. One would expect that the information asymmetries, with 
regard to the political/strategic objectives pursued by the government or legislature, 
would be lower for ministerial departments and sector-specific regulators than it 
would be the case for competition authorities, hence providing some advantages to the 
first two in the comparative institutional analysis.  
A “participation-centered” approach, as it has been advanced in some accounts of 
comparative institutional analysis
80
, will not commit the fallacies of one-sided interest 
group analysis to only focus on the risk of over representation of minority interests 
seeking rents, but it will search for all affected groups in various dimensions and will 
examine how the distribution of benefits and costs of action would affect the ability of 
different groups to get what they want via the different institutions. From this 
perspective, the over-representation of some majority interests (e.g. consumers) might 
also lead to unsatisfactory results from the point of view of welfare and should not be 
overlooked. According to this theory, it is important to focus on the factors 
determining a group‟s marginal cost of participation. In Komesar‟s “participation-
centered” model, “information costs” and “organization costs” determine a group‟s 
participation costs
81
. The first refer to the costs of learning the law and procedures 
applicable as well as the costs for the specific institution to gather information. In 
view of the almost continuous relation between sector specific regulators and 
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regulated undertakings and the amount of information provided by the latter to the 
former, in order to assist the sector specific regulator in its price setting function, the 
costs of gathering information are lower for sector-specific regulators than it is the 
case for competition authorities. Assuming that the costs of learning the law and 
procedures applicable are similar, sector-specific regulators may have some 
comparative advantages. 
The organization costs facing a group are the costs to be incurred by the members 
who want to take action, and want other members to contribute. Organization costs 
increase with group size. The size of each member‟s individual stake - how much she 
stands to gain from winning - also affects her inclination to organize her fellow 
members. It follows that organization costs rise as individual stakes decrease. The 
dispute resolution can thus be biased in two ways: a “minority bias” when a small 
group with high individual stakes convinces an institution to enact its preferred policy 
and by doing so inflicts a greater cost on a large group with lower individual stakes 
than the benefit it obtains
82, or a “majoritarian bias” when a large group with low 
individual stakes prevails and thereby inflicts a greater cost on a small, high-stakes 
group than the benefit it obtains
83
. Once a dispute has been identified, the goal of 
comparative institutional analysis is thus to find the institution least likely to develop 
a minority or majoritarian bias, that is, the institution where the group with the highest 
total stake is most likely to win. 
 
*** 
 
In conclusion, current accounts of the interaction between competition law and state 
activities are based on a clear-cut old liberalism style distinction between 
“state”/“government” and “market”, which do not take into account the emergence of 
the neo-liberal state. By doing so, they also ignore the multi-faceted nature of the 
concept of “state”, and the important inputs of political science and sociological 
literature on the different forms of state and the role of public bureaucracies. By 
advancing a “bureaucracy theory” of the competition law and the state interaction, 
based on the use of the tool of comparative institutional analysis, this chapter aims to 
offer an alternative inter-disciplinary theoretical framework that can be successfully 
transposed into different institutional and cultural settings. 
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